Papers

Most of these are penultimate versions of the published papers. If you would like a copy of the published version, please email me at wbradley@syr.edu.

  1. Incommensurabililty, Conditional Value, and the Procreation Asymmetry. Analysis, forthcoming.
  2. Hedonism. In Copp, Rosati and Rulli (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Normative Ethics (Oxford, forthcoming).
  3. Prudence, Beneficence, and Time. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 14 (2025): 31-48.
  4. Dorsey’s Welfare Subjectivism. Res Philosophica 101 (2024): 143-50.
  5. Glasgow on Death’s Badness and Radiant Value. Journal of Philosophical Research 48 (2023): 293-300.
  6. Should We Admire Athletes? In Danielle Coombs and Anne Osborne (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Sports Fans and Fandom (Routledge, 2022), pp. 116-124.
  7. Fitting Attitudes Toward Deprivations. In Travis Timmerman and Michael Cholbi (eds.), Exploring the Philosophy of Death and Dying: Classical and Contemporary Perspectives (Routledge, 2020), pp. 162-169.
  8. A Defense of Temporal Wellbeing. Res Philosophica 97 (2020): 1-7.
  9. A Gradualist View about the Badness of Death. In Espen Gamlund and Carl Tollef-Solberg (eds.), Saving People from the Harm of Death (Oxford, 2019), pp. 134-145.
  10. Contemporary Consequentialist Theories of Virtue. In Nancy Snow (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Virtue (Oxford, 2018), pp. 398-412.
  11. Well-Being at a Time. Philosophic Exchange 45 (2016): 1-12.
  12. Character and Consequences In Iskra Fileva (ed.), Questions of Character (Oxford, 2016), pp. 78-88.
  13. Well-Being and Death. In Guy Fletcher (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being (Routledge, 2016), pp. 320-328.
  14. Existential Terror. The Journal of Ethics 19 (2015): 409-418.
  15. How Should We Feel About Death? Philosophical Papers 44 (2015): 1-14.
  16. Is Death Bad for a Cow? In Tatjana Višak and Robert Garner (eds.), The Ethics of Killing Animals (Oxford, 2015), pp. 51-64.
  17. Objective Theories of Well-Being in Dale Miller and Ben Eggleston (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism (Cambridge, 2014), pp. 199-215.
  18. Why Leave Nature Alone? In Avram Hiller, Ramona Ilea and Leonard Kahn (eds.), Consequentialism and Environmental Ethics (Routledge, 2014), pp. 92-103.
  19. Death and Desires (with Kris McDaniel). In James S. Taylor (ed.), The Ethics and Metaphysics of Death: New Essays (Oxford, 2013), pp. 118-133.
  20. Asymmetries in Benefiting, Harming, and Creating. The Journal of Ethics 17 (2013): 37-49.
  21. Intrinsic Value. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics (Blackwell, 2013).
  22. Instrumental Value. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics (Blackwell, 2013).
  23. Philosophical Utilitarianism. In James Crimmins (ed.), The Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism (Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. 408-410.
  24. Doing Away With Harm. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2012): 390-412.
  25. Fischer on Death and Unexperienced Evils. Philosophical Studies 158 (2012): 507-13.
  26. Narrativity, Freedom, and Redeeming the Past. Social Theory and Practice 37 (2011): 47-62.
  27. Benatar and the Logic of Betterness. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, March 2010.
  28. Eternalism and Death’s Badness. In Campbell, O’Rourke and Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity (MIT, 2010), pp. 271-81.
  29. Saving People and Flipping Coins. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (2009): 1-13.
  30. Desires (with Kris McDaniel). Mind 117 (2008): 267-302.
  31. The Worst Time to Die. Ethics 118 (2008): 291-314.
  32. A Paradox for Some Theories of Welfare. Philosophical Studies 133 (2007): 45-53.
  33. How Bad Is Death? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2007): 111-127.
  34. Against Satisficing Consequentialism. Utilitas 18 (2006): 97-108.
  35. Virtue Consequentialism. Utilitas 17 (2005): 282-298.
  36. “Doing and Allowing” and Doing and Allowing (with Michael Stocker). Ethics 115 (2005): 799-808.
  37. When Is Death Bad for the One Who Dies? Nous 38 (2004): 1-28.
  38. Is Intrinsic Value Conditional? Philosophical Studies 107 (2002): 23-44.
  39. The Value of Endangered Species. The Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (2001): 43-58.
  40. Extrinsic Value. Philosophical Studies 91 (1998): 109-126

Book Reviews

  1. Joseph Mendola, Goodness and Justice. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2012): 233-43.
  2. Fred Feldman, Pleasure and the Good Life. Utilitas 22 (2010): 232-4.
  3. Steven Luper, The Philosophy of Death. Ethics 120 (2010): 395-98.
  4. Steven Luper, The Philosophy of Death. Times Literary Supplement, October 1, 2010, p. 29.
  5. Robert Adams, A Theory of Virtue. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (May 2007).
  6. Michael Zimmerman, The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 492-494.